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INTRODUCTION

Judicial supremacy is the new judicial review. From the time Alexander
Bickel introduced the term "countermajoritarian difficulty" in 19621 until very
recently, justifying judicial authority to strike down legislation in a nation
committed to democratic self-government was the central problem of
constitutional theory. But many who had satisfied themselves as to the
legitimacy of judicial review have since taken up the related but distinct
question of whether, though legitimate, constitutional interpretation should be
the exclusive province of the judiciary. That is, is it ever appropriate to locate
constitutional interpretive authority outside of constitutional courts, whether
within the coordinate branches of government or the citizenry more generally?
Recent attacks on judicial supremacy, mostly from the academic left, have
sought to debunk the strongest form of the proposition that the Constitution
means whatever the Supreme Court says it means. Thus, Larry Kramer traces
the history of popular constitutionalism as a bulwark against the robust vision
of judicial supremacy advanced by the Warren Court in cases like Cooper v.
Aaron.' Reva Siegel and Robert Post denounce the "juricentricity" of the
Rehnquist Court, which they say should have been more attentive to the
contributions of political culture to constitutional meaning.3 Mark Tushnet
argues provocatively that citizens and public officials should disregard
Supreme Court constitutional pronouncements that conflict with their
reasonable conceptions of what he calls the "thin" Constitution.4 And Jeremy
Waldron suggests that in modern liberal democracies, judicial review is vastly
inferior to the legislative process at setting questions of rights.'
There is an irony in all this rending of tunics over judicial power. Popular
constitutionalists believe that the people themselves should play an active role

1.

See ALEXANDER

M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:

THE

SUPREME COURT AT THE

BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
2.

358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (083),
"declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system"); see LARRY

D.

KRAMER,

THE

PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

(2004).
3.

Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).

4.

See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). On

Tushnet's terminology, the "thin" Constitution comprises the fundamental guarantees of
liberty and equality that it shares with the Declaration of Independence. See id. at ii.
5.

See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case AgainstjudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (20o6).
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in constitutional elaboration. But the place of federal judges within our system
is itself of constitutional dimension. Our federal judges are creatures of the
Constitution, their duties mandated in the rather bare terms of Article III and
the scope of their power answerable to the people in their exercise of higher
lawmaking. Settling the role of the federal judiciary vis-t-vis other political
institutions is a matter of what Keith Whittington has called "constitutional
construction," the ongoing creation of the Constitution's meaning through
"the political melding of the document with external interests and principles."6
Constitutional construction is sympathetic with the popular turn in
constitutional theory, describing as it does the process by which constitutional
ambiguity is resolved outside the courts by nonjudicial actors.
On the very terms of the debate to which popular constitutionalists have
rightly steered scholarly attention, the fact that judicial supremacy was frowned
upon in ages past should not, then, be sufficient reason to displace it today.
Rather, we must evaluate the institution of judicial supremacy as a product of
constitutional construction and according to the criteria that a privileging of
dynamic and popular construction demands. Judges are not supreme just
because they say so, but neither are they subordinate just because legal
academics say they should be. An attack on judicial supremacy is an act of
political advocacy, not a declaration of truth; assessing the normative argument
requires us to ask why others appear to accept the institution, whether that
acceptance is adequately informed, and whether it is premised on an attractive
conception of state power. Only after understanding the underexplained appeal
of judicial supremacy to those outside the judiciary may we assess its
theoretical bona fides and, as appropriate, either mourn or celebrate its
ascension.
Digging to the roots of that appeal is yeoman's work, though, and

Whittington tries his hand in a careful new book, Political Foundations of
Judicial Supremacy! Whittington recognizes the need for an account of the
conventionality of judicial supremacy that incorporates the motives of other
political players. "[T]he Court's judgments will have no force unless other
powerful political actors accept the importance of the interpretive task and the
priority of the judicial voice," he says.8 "For the Court to compete successfully,

6.

KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1 (1999).

7.

KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: TI-E
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(2007).

8.

Id. at 26.

CONSTRUCTION:

DIVIDED

POWERS

AND
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other political actors must have reasons for allowing the Court to 'win."' 9
Whittington argues that members of the elected branches, and presidents in
particular, historically have bolstered and sustained judicial supremacy in order
to conserve their own political resources. As Part I explains, Whittington excels
at what I call the microtheory part of his project: his description of elected
officials' incentives to prop up the judiciary-whether as a means of enforcing
political commitments against opposition forces, circumventing veto gates, or
delegating decision-making authority on issues of low political return.
Whittington's book is structured, however, around a macrotheory that
proves far less persuasive. Whittington relies on a taxonomy of presidential
types that situates administrations along a spectrum from the "reconstructive"
presidencies of men such as Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt;
to presidents who are "affiliated" with an orthodox political regime, such as
William Howard Taft and Lyndon Johnson; to "oppositional" presidents like
Grover Cleveland and Bill Clinton who, through coalition-building, come to
power despite being out of step with the ideological commitments of the
dominant regime. Differently situated presidents face different sets of political
incentives, which influence their relative support for judicial supremacy. Only
in reconstructive presidencies, which are rare, can we expect to see a fullthroated attack on the Court's ultimate interpretive authority.'0
It would be too strong to say that I reject this model. It may well be that, at
least in retrospect, one can array presidents along something like Whittington's
spectrum, and in order to understand fully the reality of nested opposition
between the judiciary and elected officials, one certainly needs to tell a story
about relative levels of political capital. But as Part II discusses, Whittington
fails to demonstrate that his taxonomy bears any necessary relation to the
growth or survival of judicial supremacy, a subject central to his project but
which he too often elides with judicial affection. Ours is a constitutional history
rife with interbranch conflict, no less so in recent years than early on, and yet
the strong secular trend since at least the end of the Civil War is growing
support for judicial supremacy among elected officials, judges themselves, and
large numbers of citizens more generally. Showing any one of these buttresses
to be "foundational" is an ambitious undertaking that Whittington fails to pull
off.
In truth, Whittington devotes little space to defending the view that
institutional political support is uniquely necessary to judicial supremacy. His
writing is tactical, his composition admirably precise. Pigeonholing broad

9.

Id.

1o. Id.at 23-25.
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swaths of history into narrow and contestable conclusions does not seem to
suit Whittington's intellectual temperament. But the cost of responsible
inquiry is relevance, and I wonder how far Whittington has advanced the ball
toward understanding the origins of judicial supremacy. As Part III discusses,
the thickness of our reliance on judicial supremacy suggests roots both deeper
and more diffuse than systematic political expediency can supply. Courts are
part of a collective self-conception that includes an institutional commitment to
justice and individual rights; they serve as a form of political insurance for both
systematic and occasional political losers; they provide a measure of
predictability that assists us in ordering our personal and professional affairs;
and they figure in the expedient resolution of values debates that cannot be
sorted out through the retail political process. The relative stability of our
particular form of constitutional politics should motivate us to ask not whether
judicial supremacy is a correct understanding of the role judges should play in
our system, but instead, whether it is a valuable one. To answer that question,
the political foundations of judicial supremacy to which we must attend are not
our presidents' motives but our own.
I.

THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF COURTS

It is dangerous, not just to us but to them as well, for politicians to have too
much power. With authority, alas, comes discretion, which is not always
helpful in trying to run a government. Consider the following. On August 17,
1961, defectors diverted a Russian-bound Cuban merchant boat, the Bahia de
Nipe, and received permission to dock in Lynnhaven, Virginia. 1 The next day,
libels were filed against the vessel by various individuals and businesses that
had unsatisfied claims against the Cuban government, which owned the boat.
In response, Cuba requested, via a communiqu6 to the State Department, that
the United States recognize its right to sovereign immunity and return the
vessel to Cuba. 2 The Bahia de Nipe arrived in U.S. territory barely a year after
the Bay of Pigs invasion and at the end of two weeks of diplomatic negotiations
for the return of a hijacked U.S. airplane that had been diverted to Havana.
The plane had been secured in exchange for the release of a Cuban patrol boat
that was being held in Key West. 3 As Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote
understatedly in an August 19, 1961, letter to Attorney General Robert

11. See Rich v. NavieraVacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 25 (4 th Cir. 1961).
12.

See 1

ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAs EHRLICH & ANDREAS

PROCESS 122 (1968).

13.

See id. at 88-103.

F.

LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
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Kennedy, "the release of [the Bahia de Nipe] would avoid further disturbance
14
to our international relations in the premises.
Unsurprisingly, the State Department acquiesced and filed a suggestion of
immunity in the district court. Adhering to the Supreme Court's instruction of
near-absolute deference to the Executive on assertions of foreign immunity,"5
the court dismissed the suit and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.16
The potential negative diplomatic ramifications of the State Department's
refusal to exercise its discretion to grant immunity overwhelmed all other
considerations, including the impact the decision would have on the
investment-backed expectations of the domestic business community. The
suggestion of immunity conflicted, after all, with the instructions given in
former State Department acting legal adviser Jack Tate's well-known letter of
1952.'7 The Tate letter dictated that the United States would thenceforward
adhere to the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, under which "the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (juregestionis).,18 At
least some of the libellants' claims unquestionably arose from Cuba's
commercial activities, but adhering to the Tate standard when the Department
had the discretion to do otherwise was not a realistic diplomatic option.19
Under the circumstances, it might well have been better that the State
Department not have the discretion in the first place. State and Justice
Department officials recognized this as early as the Johnson Administration,
when study began on what eventually became the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 2° The FSIA sought formally to incorporate the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity into U.S. law and to provide

14.

Letter from Dean Rusk, Sec'y of State, to Robert Kennedy, Att'y Gen. (Aug. 19, 1961), in
CHAYES ET AL., supra note 12, at 1O9.

is.

See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-38 (1945); Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).

16.

Rich, 295 F.2d at 26.
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman,

17.

Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 984 (1952).
18.

Id. at 984.

ig.

See Kevin P. Simmons, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the
Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 548-49 (1977) (calling the State
Department's decision in Rich "completely inconsistent with the policies that it had
announced in the Tate letter" but noting that "notwithstanding adoption of the Tate Letter,
the State Department, as an essentially political body, often succumbed to the daily
exigencies of political pressure exerted by foreign states and issued State Department
suggestions in return for concessions or political trade-offs on the foreign relations front").

20.

Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Star.
(2006)).

2891

(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
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jurisdiction to federal courts to determine its application. 2' Thus, the FSIA
retains a default of sovereign immunity and provides enumerated exceptions,
most significantly for the foreign state's commercial activities." Even though
the FSIA purported to curtail significantly presidential power to grant or to
deny immunity, namely by placing that decision within the judiciary, the Act
was drafted by the State and Justice Departments based on work done over
three administrations from both major political parties.2 3 Former State
Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh testified to the difficulties occasioned
by the Tate letter at the FSIA committee hearing:
If the Department follows the Tate letter in a given case, it is in the
incongruous position of a political institution trying to apply a legal
standard to litigation already before the courts. On the other hand, if
forced to disregard the Tate letter in a given case, the Department is in
the self-defeating position of abandoning the very international law
principle it elsewhere espouses....

[W]e would hope that in most cases we would be able to resist
[political pressures from foreign governments], but in practice I would
have to say to you in candor that the State Department, being a political
institution, has not always been able to resist these pressures. And to
my way of thinking, this consideration of political factors is, in fact, the
very antithesis of the rule of law which we would like to see
established.4

21.

See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 66o5.

22.

28 U.S.C. 5 16o5(a)(2) (zooo); see Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v.
City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352, 2358 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

23.

See Harvey M. Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of S. 566, 8 INT'L
LAW. 408, 408 (1974); Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 43 (1978); Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 50
n.4 (1976).

24.

Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
9 4 th

Cong. 26, 35 (1976) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser,
Department of State).
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It has not been much easier for courts to apply the restrictive theory than it
was for the State Department. 2' But to evaluate the success of the FSIA on that
basis is to miss the point. Although the State Department still routinely
participates in immunity disputes as amicus curiae, it does so on the
understanding that its recommendations are just that.26 This, quite explicitly,
27
is Ulysses lashing himself to the mast.
Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all had incentives to give to the
judiciary a foreign affairs power that the Court had previously sought to
disclaim. And although the Supreme Court has described grants of sovereign

25.

See ERNEST K.

BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

94

(calling court application of the restrictive theory "cumbersome and elusive"). The
drafters of the FSIA intentionally left vague the definition of "commercial activity" in order
that the courts might develop standards on their own in a common law fashion. See Hearing,
supra note 24, at 53 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State) ("We
realize that we probably could not draft legislation which would satisfactorily delineate [the]
line of demarcation between commercial and governmental. We therefore thought it was the
better part of valor to recognize our inability to do that definitively and to leave it to the
courts with very modest guidance.").
By way of example, the State Department argued as amicus curiae in PermanentMission that
a municipal tax lien on real property did not put in issue "rights in immovable property"
and therefore did not trigger an exemption from India's sovereign immunity under 28
U.S.C. § 16o5(a)(4) (2000). See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S.
Ct. 2352 (2007) (No. o6-134). Two decades earlier the State Department had argued the
opposite position when the issue was whether there was federal court jurisdiction to
adjudicate a municipal tax lien on a recreational home for the head of Libya's Mission to the
United Nations. See id. at 19 n.15 (discussing City of Englewood v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 773 F.2d 31 (3 d Cir. 1985)). It is possible that two different administrations
simply adopted inconsistent legal positions in the two cases, but it is difficult not to wonder
at the relevance of the fact that at the time of City of Englewood the United States had no
diplomatic relations with Libya and had designated it as a state sponsor of terrorism. See
Edward Schumacher, The United States and Libya, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 329 (1986). The State
Department lost both cases.
The House committee report on the FSIA made clear that the statute was expressly designed
to tie the State Department's hands:
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign
immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the
foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants
that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process. The Department of State would be freed from
pressures from foreign governments to recognize their immunity from suit and
from any adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the
Department to support that immunity.
(2005)

26.

27.

H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606; see also

Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,487-88 (1983).
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immunity as a matter of comity rather than of constitutional imperative,28 the
question of who decides certainly has constitutional dimensions. If a President
wished to grant immunity to a foreign sovereign engaged in commercial
activity within the meaning of the FSIA, it is far from clear that either Congress
or the Court would have the constitutional authority to prevent him from
doing so. 29 Executive embrace of the FSIA is therefore a clear example of
political support for judicial supremacy in certain constitutional matters.
Whittington offers a rich account-what I call his microtheory-of why
elected officials are apt rather often to behave in this counterintuitive way.
Nixon's presidency, and to a lesser extent Ford's, were what Whittington,
drawing on the work of Stephen Skowronek,3 ° alternately calls "preemptive" or
"oppositional." On Whittington's account, preemptive presidents manage to
win office despite their hostility to a political regime that remains "vibrant,
popular, and resilient to pressure."31 Such presidents often cobble together
unorthodox coalitions (think Grover Cleveland's uniting of Northeast
Mugwumps and Southern Bourbon Democrats) and might be assisted by
spoilers, such as Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 or Ross Perot in 1992. In the
modern idiom, these are the great triangulators, often facing opposition both
from the other side of the aisle and from stalwarts within their own party, but
32
winning elections all the same.

Because preemptive presidents lack a stable base of support and often
preside over a divided government, they lack the political capital to challenge
the Court's constitutional authority directly.33 But on Whittington's telling,
their support for judicial supremacy is not just defensive. The Supreme Court
is notoriously slow to embrace institutional change; if the Senate is the nation's
cooling saucer, the Court is its refrigerator. Constitutional law is existentially
predisposed to maintaining commitments over time, 4 and so "[t]he law,

28. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486; Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, ii U.S. (7Cranch) 116
(1812).

29. See, e.g., Lawrence Allan Nathanson, Note, "Imperatives of Events and Contemporary

Imponderables": The Effect of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on PresidentialPower,

62

B.U. L. REv. 1275 (1982).
30.

See

31.

"disjunctive" presidencies).
WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 161.

32.

See id. at 206.

33.

See id.at 166.

STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS
TO GEORGE BUSH 34-45 (1993) (distinguishing between "reconstructive," "affiliated," and

34. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 168

(2001)

("[Constitutionalism] is democracy-or

at least it ought to be, it promises to be, it holds itself out as the possibility of, democracy-
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especially constitutional law, is likely to have a relatively long history, its
origins predating the rise of the currently dominant regime."" Not only is law
inherently resistant to temporary partisan shifts, but judges themselves,
particularly the unelected, life-tenured federal sort, are socialized into a culture
of resistance to transitory political pressure. 6 The otherwise lonely preemptive
president, out of step with the commitments of the political regime du jour,
might therefore find in the Court a comrade in arms. Thus, when the
Reconstruction Congress impeached Andrew Johnson for violating the Tenure
of Office Act through his dismissal of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton,
Johnson pleaded that the matter be "'submitted to that judicial department of
the government intrusted by the Constitution' with the power to say what the
law means."37 You would say the same in Johnson's shoes.
Oppositional presidents are not the only ones with reason to promote
judicial supremacy. Lyndon Johnson, whose State and Justice Departments
began the machinations that produced the FSIA, fits Whittington's description
of an "affiliated leader." These presidents are associated with and come to
power espousing the precepts of the dominant regime. Johnson's Great Society
reforms may be understood as a refinement of Roosevelt's New Deal, a
"continuing, extending, or more creative[] reconceptualizing [of] the
38
fundamental commitments made by an earlier reconstructive leader.
Affiliated leaders may have good reason to raise the volume of the Court's
interpretive voice. Whittington's leitmotifis the complexity and diversity of the
American constitutional order, whose federalism deliberately frustrates the
widespread propagation of political orthodoxy.3 9 Judicial supremacy may serve
as a work-around of sorts insofar as the judiciary can be used to police state
and local actors who resist the dominant regime.4" We see this dynamic most

35.
36.
37.

over time."); see also Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1056 n.73 (1984) ("By virtue of its life tenure, the Supreme Court will
characteristically be the last institution to be dominated by a new governing coalition.").
WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 167.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 184 (quoting 1

TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF

(Washington, D.C., Gov't
Printing Office 1868)); Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867) (repealed
REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 40

1887).
38.

WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 23.

39.

See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 1o (James Madison).

40. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 105.
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obviously with President Kennedy's warm embrace of the Warren Court's
enforcement of cultural liberalism against the states.4 1
The Court's relative insulation from quotidian politics provides additional
incentive for affiliated presidents and other elected officials in effect to delegate
decision making to the judiciary. Whittington argues that members of
Congress are generally less likely than presidents to launch conspicuous
assaults on judicial supremacy, 4 and he identifies instances in which political
expediency counsels deference to the third branch. Elected officials can take
positions and make decisions on popular elements of their political program
and allow the Court to make decisions on less popular or lower visibility issues.
This is, of course, a matter of simple posturing, whereby Congress bats
political hot potatoes across First Street, voting for or not strongly opposing
legislation that it hopes will be struck down, but it is also a matter of
conserving valuable political energy. 43 Consider the growing prevalence of
statutory provisions for expedited Supreme Court review, which the Court
recently described as "responding to a congressional concern that if a provision
of the statute is declared invalid there is an interest in prompt adjudication by
this Court." 44 Such provisions were added to statutes such as the Flag
Protection Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to enable
skeptical legislators to hold their noses and vote for popular bills that they
opposed on constitutional or even partisan grounds. 4' The availability and

41.

Id. at 117-19.

42.

See id. at 15-16. Whittington suggests that Congress is not well-positioned to assert
legislative supremacy, in part because such assertions are almost invariably tested in the
courts themselves. See id. at 16.

43.

See id. at

44.

Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson,

120-24, 134-52.

127 S. Ct. 2o18, 2021 (2007); see also Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1998) ("The special section [of the Line Item Veto
Act] authorizing expedited review evidences an unmistakable congressional interest in a
prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Act."). Neal
Devins has noted that the expedited review provisions of several recent high-profile statutes
were added to the bills only after constitutional objections were raised: "Congress-rather
than settle the issue itself-decided that it was best to hand the matter off to the Supreme

Court." Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On the Court's AntiCongressCrusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 443 (2001).
45.

See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2004); Flag Protection Act of 1989

§ 3, 18

2002

U.S.C.

§ 4o3(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a)(3) (Supp.
§ 7oo(d) (2000); cf President's Statement

on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 517,
517-18 (Mar. 27, 2002) (signing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act despite First Amendment
"questions" and "reservations about the constitutionality of the broad ban on issue
advertising" in the expectation that "the courts will resolve these legitimate legal questions
as appropriate under the law").
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finality of judicial review thereby streamlines the business of the political
branches. This redounds to the benefit of an affiliated leader and his
congressional allies, who may then devote more
resources to enacting and
6
agenda.4
their
of
aspects
other
for
credit
taking
Robert Dahl argues in his well-known essay on judicial decision making
that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line
with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States."47 The rightness of that hypothesis as stated depends on one's
definition of "long," but it is correct in any event if we regard "never" as
hyperbole. Given the usual affinity of judges for the dominant regime, it makes
sense that affiliated leaders would seek to share power with them. Governance
takes time and energy, and judges have a different and useful set of resources to
offer. uite unlike Congress, their decisions require the assent of one, or two,
or at most five, and so often can be predicted with confidence and implemented
with relatively little to-do. 48 As an impetuous sibling seeks comfort in parental
arbitration, elected officials may use the judiciary to validate their side of
political debates. 49 And as the FSIA example illustrates, delegation to the courts
helps political actors resist the siren song of political expediency in favor of
long-term commitments that are more valuable in the end. °
Nearly every president may be characterized as either preemptive or
affiliated in Whittington's taxonomy, and so nearly every president has found
himself frequently in a position to affirm judicial supremacy. But every now
and again a president carries a mandate for a new political order. The regimes
against which the others are defined-those that other leaders are either
affiliated with or opposed to-must themselves be created by what
Whittington, here relying expressly on Skowronek, calls "reconstructive"
presidencies: those of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and to a lesser
degree, Reagan. The authority of reconstructive regimes is "rooted in
antagonism to existing commitments, allowing them to gain prestige precisely
through their efforts to shatter the inherited constitutional order.""1 In terms
more familiar to legal scholars, reconstructive presidencies are the stuff
"constitutional moments" are made of, when "[a]s a result of many electoral

46.

See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 136-38.

47. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
48.

See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 124-25.

49. See id. at 152.
50.

See id.
at 86.

51. Id. at 50.
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victories on many different levels, a broad movement of transformative
opinion
52
... earn[s] the authority to set major aspects of the political agenda.
According to Whittington, reconstructive presidents alone have both the
will and the power to challenge the Court's interpretive authority. The courts
are not just part of the ancien r6gime but might indeed be partly responsible
for the revolutionary condition. A recalcitrant Court might "push[] forward
with its inherited and evolving political agenda even in the face of increasing
tensions within the dominant political coalition." 3 Court intransigence may
help provoke a robust demonstration of political power-witness the 1936
electoral landslide, which cemented the authority of Roosevelt's essentially
populist, antibusiness New Deal coalition and emboldened the President to
propose his Court-packing legislation. 4 Constitutional change is typically part
of the reconstructive enterprise, making conflict with the Court inevitable.
Perhaps the boldest instance of such conflict is Jackson's 1832 veto of the
rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States, in which he dismissed
McCulloch v. Maryland55 as just one man's opinion:
The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than
the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the
President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court
must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the
Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but 6to have only
such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.5
Jackson's departmentalism owes a debt to Jefferson, 7 but his aggressive and
reactionary populism was a fundamental rebranding of Jefferson's more
restrained republicanism. Says Whittington, "Conflicts with the courts are only
a single skirmish within the larger [reconstructive] presidential offensive to
establish his authority to remake American politics . ... "' Jackson's challenge
to the Court's interpretive authority was of a piece with his challenge to

52.

2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 409 (1998).

53.

WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 72.

54.

See ACKERMAN, supra note 52, at 312-14; WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 57-58.

55.

17 U.S. 316 (1819).

56.

President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message to the Senate (July to, 1832), reprinted in 2 JAMES
D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 17891897, at 576, 582 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office 1898); see WHITTINGTON, supra

note 7, at 59-61.
57.

See KRAMER, supra note 2, at 189.

58. WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 59.
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legislative supremacy and his effort to remake the nation in his own anti-elite
image.5 9
Everything judges do is paid for or enforced by political actors. Jackson was
conspicuously aware of the implications of that dependency, but most
presidents prefer not to dwell on it. 6 ° Instead, the exigencies of political life
lead them to participate in and reinforce a political ethos of judicial supremacy.
Members of Congress also participate, lacking the bully pulpit or the unity of
purpose necessary to stake a credible claim to legislative supremacy. 6,
Whittington's valuable contribution is to emphasize and elaborate upon the
very good reasons why the departmentalist claims celebrated by some
proponents of popular constitutionalism are the exception, not the rule of
American politics.
Whittington is of the "regime politics" tradition in political science, which
long ago rejected the idea that judicial behavior may be usefully explained
without a full accounting of the pressures that the rest of the polity exerts on
judges. 62 Thinking of judges as autonomous Herculean actors who exist to
stem the tides of popular will does not get us far toward understanding why
they make the decisions they do. Rather, and indisputably, courts are
semiautonomous political instruments whose activities are "one of many
means politicians and political movements employ when seeking to make their
constitutional visions the law of the land." 6, Whittington capably demonstrates
that no single thread runs through the various reasons politicians like judicial
supremacy. Understanding why a particular President finds comfort in the
judiciary at a particular historical moment requires identifying his place in
what Skowronek has called "political time" - the state of the relationship

See id. at 6o-6i.
6o. Historians disagree whether Jackson threatened not to enforce any injunction that might be
issued (and never was) in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,30 U.S. 1 (1831). See Anton-Hermann
Chroust, Brevia Addenda: Did President Jackson Actually Threaten the Supreme Court of the
United States with Nonenforcement of ts Injunction Against the State of Georgia?,4 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 76 (196o). As Whittington writes, Jackson's famous response to the Court's
subsequent decision in Worcester v. Georgia,31 U.S. 515 (1832) -"John Marshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it"- is likely apocryphal. WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 33.
But what Jackson undeniably did say-"[t]he decision of the supreme court has fell still
born, and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate" - is just as
dismissive of Court power. Id. at 34 (quoting 4 ANDREW JACKSON, THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF ANDREW JACKSON 430 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1929)).
5g-

7, at 15-16.

61.

WHITTINGTON, supra note

62.

See Martin Shapiro, Public Law and judicial Politics, in 2 POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF
THE DISCIPLINE 365 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993).
Mark A. Graber, ConstructingJudicialReview, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCi. 425, 427 (2005).

63.
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between the President's own interests and commitments and the ideological
landscape in which he comes to power.6 4 This must be right, and indeed (as
with most great insights) feels rather obvious in retrospect.
I. THE GROWTH OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

Whittington wants to do more, though, than simply explain the
phenomenon of support for judicial supremacy by elected officials. Had he
titled his book "Political Acquiescence in Judicial Supremacy," it would have
been shorter, less interesting, and more successful. But to tell a story of
creation, as is Whittington's ambition, he must make the case that the support
of institutional actors is not just consistent with judicial supremacy but is in
fact responsible for it. This he has not done. His observations about the
motivations of political actors to preserve judicial independence are incisive, at
times brilliant, but he does not make the link between political support for
judges and the inception, growth, or continuing health of the institution of
judicial supremacy.
Let's begin where we left off, with reconstructive presidencies. Whittington
rightly argues that the strongest reconstructive presidents are best-situated to
make departmentalist claims. "Reconstructive presidents are notable for their
expansive authority to remake the political environment in their own image,"
he says, "resolving conflict through their own political actions rather than
through judicial dictate. 6,It should follow, then, that judicial supremacy as an
institution is at its low ebb during reconstructive periods. Indeed, Whittington
says as much: "Judicial authority to define constitutional meaning is likely to
be weakest when contested by presidents armed with such a powerful
mandate., 66 Likely to be, perhaps, but is it? This book does not make the case.
The relationship between presidential reservations of interpretive authority
and the prosperity of judicial supremacy as an institution is complicated and
difficult to measure. The Court itself is likely to respond to a weak strategic
position by avoiding conflict with the political branches. Conflict avoidance
might take the form of resort to manipulable prudential mechanisms like
ripeness, standing, or the political question doctrine; it might be reflected in
docket control, particularly in the post-1925 era of largely discretionary

64. SKOWRONEK, supra note 30, at 30.
65. WHITrINGTON, supra note 7, at 78.
66. Id. at 77.
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Supreme Court review;67 or it might simply recommend deference on the
merits. 68 The Court was particularly adept at self-restraint under Marshall's
stewardship. For all the Chief Justice's braggadocio in cases like Marbury v.
Madison6' and McCulloch v. Maryland, his Court carefully husbanded its
resources. The Court struck down only one federal law during Marshall's
tenure- the provision of the Judiciary Act of 178971 declared unconstitutional
in Marbury-and its docket was dominated by land title disputes about which
hardly anyone but the parties could get animated. 72 As Mark Graber writes,
"[c]onstitutional issues of more political consequence in Jacksonian America,
such as the national bank, internal improvements, tariffs, and national
expansion, were settled by elected officials with little if any judicial
involvement. 73
Public confidence in the Court rose dramatically into the 1850S.74 Wrote
Charles Warren of the antebellum years, "While there were extremists and
radicals in both parties ...who inveighed against it and its decisions, yet the
general mass of the public and the Bar had faith in its impartiality and its
ability. ' 75 Over the period from Marbury to Dred Scott v. Sandford,76 Barry
Friedman writes, "the public came gradually to accept the binding effect of
Supreme Court constitutional pronouncements, not only upon the parties to
the case, but upon other branches of state and national government and future
litigants as well. ' 77 It is well-known that Dred Scott led Lincoln and others to

67. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (1926) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 344-50 (2000)).
68. Bickel's is the classic treatment of "the mediating techniques of 'not doing."' BICKEL, supra
note 1,at 112. See generally ui. at 111-98 (discussing "the passive virtues").
69. 5U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
70-

17 U.S. 316 (1819).

71.

Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.

72.

See Mark A. Graber, PopularConstitutionalism,Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete LincolnDouglasDebates, 81 CHi.-KENT L. REv.923, 931 (2006).

73- Id. at 932. Elsewhere Graber has labeled Marshall's penchant for bold but empty rhetoric the

"passive-aggressive virtues": "Strict Jeffersonians, old Republicans, and Jacksonians may
have frequently been enraged by the tone of early Supreme Court opinions, but Marshall
and his brethren rarely reached decisions that these political leaders could actually disobey."
Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic
Establishmentofjudicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67, 68 (1995).
supra note 7, at 107.

74.

See WHITTINGTON,

75.

2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 206 (1926).

76.

6o U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

77. Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDfficulty: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy (pt. 1), 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 340 (1998).
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question publicly the precedential authority of Supreme Court decisions, but
that decision could not have been rendered absent the Court's reservoir of
institutional capital. The Taney Court's intervention was explicitly invited by
Congress, the President, and the public more generally. In the debates over the
resolutions that would form the Compromise of 1850, Henry Clay defended
congressional silence on the issue of slavery in the territories by saying, "Now,
what ought to be done more satisfactory to both sides of the [slavery] question,
... [than] to leave the question of slavery or no slavery to be decided by the
only competent authority that can definitely settle it forever, the authority of
the Supreme Court of the United States?" 7s Similar language appears in the
debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. 79 Politicians with views as
diverse as Lincoln, Buchanan, and Jefferson Davis were quoted publicly saying
that the Court was uniquely competent to resolve the question that had
fractured the Congress since the nation's founding.s °
Marshall was probably wrong when he said in 1819 that "by this tribunal
alone can the decision [in McCulloch] be made. ''s Consistent with the Court's

78. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., ist Sess. 1155 (1850), quoted in WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 251-

Congress also expanded the Court's jurisdiction over slavery questions. See Wallace
Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered,38 MINN. L. REv. 16, 19 (1953).
52.

79.

Ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277. Judah Benjamin, a Democratic senator from Louisiana, said of the
deliberations:
Morning after morning we met, for the purpose of coming to some
understanding upon [slavery in the territories]; and it was finally understood by
all, agreed to by all, made the basis of a compromise by all the supporters of that
bill, that the Territories should be organized with a delegation by Congress of all
the power of Congress in the Territories, and that the extent of the power of
Congress should be determined by the Courts.

CONG. GLOBE, 3 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 1966 (186o), quoted in Mendelson, supra note 78, at 21;
see also Mendelson, supra note 78, at 21-22 (citing statements of Southern senators
suggesting their purported willingness to submit the issue to the Court even if the outcome
was not in their favor).
80. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 154 (1850) (speech of Jefferson Davis) ("We
have only said that we are entitled to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
); President Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Galena, Ill. (July 26, 1856), reprinted in
2

COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 355 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), quoted in

supra note 7, at 252 n.io6 ("The Supreme Court of the United States is the
tribunal to decide [the extension of slavery to the territories], and we [Republicans] will
submit to its decisions ... ."); Mendelson, supra note 78, at 24 (discussing Buchanan's
endorsement ofjudicial resolution in his inaugural address). The debate over the legal status
of slavery in the federal territories is as old as the existence of federal territories. See DON E.
WHITTINGTON,

FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE 41-54 (1981).
81.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.

316, 401 (1819).
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relative lack of institutional capital, the constitutionality of the Bank of the
United States was settled not by Marshall's Court but by Jackson's veto of the
second bank bill in 1832. 82 Four deae
decades later, though, there had developed a
widespread perception that only the Supreme Court could decide the status of
slavery in the federal territories. Whether trust in the Court resulted from
artful management of its institutional resources or from the ongoing support of
the political branches is something of a chicken and egg problem. But given the
aggressive departmentalist claims made by Jefferson and Jackson,8" the two
figures who so dominated nineteenth-century antebellum politics, it is
certainly not obvious that either they or the weak interstitial presidents who
surrounded them deserve much credit for creating an authoritative federal
judiciary.
The departmentalist positions of later reconstructive Presidents Lincoln,
Roosevelt, and Reagan were progressively more timid. Indeed the last two are
better described as capitulating to the Court's interpretive authority. Judicial
supremacy has seen better days than the Civil War, of course. Lincoln had
announced during the Lincoln-Douglas debates that he did not regard Dred
Scott as constitutional precedent, s4 and in 1862, Congress prohibited slavery in
the federal territories, in derogation of the case's second holding.8 Lincoln
later ignored Taney's decision in Ex parte Merryman declaring invalid Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.8 6
At least two additional points about Lincoln's relationship to the Court are
relevant to our discussion, however. First, Lincoln's claims about Dred Scott
rejected not the decision itself but its status as a binding precedent. "We do not
propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we,

8z.

See S. 147, 22d Cong., ist Sess.

83.

Jefferson wrote that "each of the three departments has equally the right to decide for itself
what is its duty under the constitution, without regard to what the others may have decided
for themselves under a similar question." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer
Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), quoted in KRAMER, supra note 2, at lO6.

(1832).

84. See infra text accompanying note 87.
85. An Act To Secure Freedom to All Persons within the Territories of the United States, ch. ill,
12 Stat. 432 (1862). Several other constitutionally contested issues, including the imposition
of a federal income tax, the issuing of paper money, and conscription, never reached the
Court during the war. See David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. Ci-HI. L. REv. 1131,
1140-41 (20o6) (taxes); id. at 1178-85 (paper money); id. at 1196-1201 (conscription); Daniel
W. Hamilton, PopularConstitutionalismin the Civil War: A Trial Run, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
953, 956 (2006).
86.

17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); see Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in
Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprintedin 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcoLN, supra
note 8o, at 421, 423.
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as a mob, will decide him to be free," he said at the sixth debate with Douglas,
"but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be
binding on... the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure
that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision."8 ' Contrast
that with Jackson's implicit endorsement of the law of the street in response to
Worcester v. Georgia. 8 Especially in light of Lincoln's previous support for
judicial supremacy, both in the years leading up to Dred Scott and earlier in his
political career,8 Lincoln's reluctance to launch a full-frontal assault on the
Court's authority surely reflects the strength of the third branch's claim to
interpretive prominence.9"
It is odd, second, to declare that either the Court's general weakness during
the Civil War or its relative strength compared to earlier Courts resulted
primarily from varying levels of support by the executive or the legislature.
Dred Scott itself deserves credit for the former. Capturing the mood in some
segments of the country, the New York Daily Tribune wrote two days after the
decision was handed down that "[i]f epithets and denunciation could sink a
judicial body, the Supreme Court of the United States would never be heard of
again."'" President Buchanan and a large chunk of the country supported the
decision,9" but they were drowned out first by a momentous presidential
election and then by force of arms. The ebb and flow of the Court's authority

87. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3
COLLECTED

WORKS OF ABRAHAM

88. 31 U.S. 515 (1832);

LINCOLN, supra note

80, at 245, 255.

see supra note 6o.

89. See Graber, supra note 72, at 923-24 (discussing the role reversal between Lincoln and
Douglas in an 184o debate over the size of the Illinois Supreme Court).
go. See Friedman, supra note 77, at 429 ("[Ulltimately those opposing the supremacy of the
Court's pronouncement [in Dred Scott] had a problem, for they were stuck between
adherence to the decision and arguing for open defiance, a position that by the time of Dred
Scott they were unprepared to take. Something had changed since Jefferson's time, or
perhaps the nature of the issue brought the problem into sharp focus."); cf Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2ooo Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 116
(2001) ("One could easily mistake Lincoln's seeming timidity [in response to Dred Scott] as
evidence of the extent to which judicial power had grown since Jefferson's time. And in a
sense it had, for Lincoln was clearly prepared to concede the Court more than were its
opponents of fifty years earlier.").
91. The Latest News, N.Y. DAiLY TRiB., Mar. 7, 1857, at 5, quoted in Friedman, supra note 77, at
417. See generally Friedman, supra note 77, at 416 ("It would be difficult to overstate the
vituperative reaction that met the Court's decision in Dred Scott. Some of the more sedate
critics made an observation common at the time: that the Court had lost the confidence of
the people.").
92. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8o, at 229-43; Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery:
Dred Scott and Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 282-93 (1997).
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in the 185Os and 186os was determined by the dynamics of public confidence in
the Court's decisions, not by the institutional needs of Congress and the
executive.
Something changed with the Civil War. After striking down two federal
statutes in the first seventy years of its existence, through Dred Scott, the Court
struck down fifty-eight in the next seventy. 93 What explains the Court's
swagger? Others have noted that explanations are wanting for the gradual rise
of judicial supremacy during Reconstruction. 94 I doubt very much, though,
that it has anything to do with the dearth of reconstructive presidencies over
that period. To be fair, Whittington does not make that claim, at least not
explicitly, but it is difficult to understand the implications of his macrotheory
without it.
Whittington of course includes Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his pantheon
of reconstructive presidents, but Roosevelt's impact on judicial supremacy is
murky. Roosevelt was frustrated by the Court's disagreement with his
constitutional vision, but he conspicuously avoided challenging the Court's
interpretive authority or seeking to limit its jurisdiction. Marian McKenna
counts more than one hundred legislative proposals offered by Roosevelt's
congressional allies in early 1936 seeking to limit judicial power, including
proposals to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction, to require a
supermajority vote to invalidate acts of Congress, and to eliminate entirely the
Court's power to invalidate federal legislation. 9 Roosevelt concluded,
however, that the Court's makeup, not its authority, was the problem.
Regarding the response of the Administration (of which he was part) to
proposals to restrict the Court's appellate review, Robert Jackson wrote,
"[N]either the President nor his advisers were prepared to go to such lengths.
Deep as was their dissatisfaction,
they felt it was men, not the institution, that
96
needed correction."

93.

ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 37 (1941).

94.

See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty (pt. 2), 91 GEO. L.J.

1, 48

(2002).

95.

See

MARIAN C. McKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR:
THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 173-74 (2002).

supra note 93, at 18o; see WHITrINGTON, supra note 7, at 266-67; William E.
Forbath, Popular Constitutionalismin the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the
Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular

96. JACKSON,

Understandingsof PopularSelf-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 985 (2006) (referring to the

New Dealers' "continued commitment to judicial finality" in their rejection of proposals to
strip power from the Court). This sentiment is of a piece with Roosevelt's heavily criticized
lament during the 1932 presidential election that "the Republican Party was in complete
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Given that the election of 1936 had handed Roosevelt and the Democrats
97
what Bruce Ackerman rightly calls "the greatest victory in American history,"
Roosevelt's refusal to attack the Court's institutional authority directly, and the
subsequent failure of his Court-packing plan, are a remarkable testament to the
Court's strength and a challenge to Whittington's macrotheory of
reconstructive presidencies. Indeed, no sitting president since-whether
reconstructive or not-has actually challenged the finality of the Court's
interpretive authority. Even Reagan, who did not conceal his hostility to the
constitutional decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, caved to judicial
supremacy. Early in Reagan's presidency, the Justice Department backed a
series of court-stripping measures, including failed proposals to limit federal
court jurisdiction over school prayer, 98 busing, 99 and abortion °° cases and to
repeal the incorporation doctrine, the exclusionary rule, and federal question
jurisdiction in the district courts.1"' But Reagan and Attorney General Edwin
Meese eventually settled on a strategy of promoting a jurisprudence of original
intent."' Unable to muster the support needed to muzzle the Court's
interpretive voice (even within the Administration),0 3 the Reagan Justice
Department sought instead to change the Court's tune. Meese's originalism
strategy, like Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, was not just unopposed to
judicial supremacy, but in fact was premised on it. Appointing originalists to
the federal bench as a central plank of a political strategy assumes that the way
to bring the courts in line is not to challenge them but to staff them properly.

control of all branches of the Federal Government -the Executive, the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and.., the Supreme Court as well." 1THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. RoOSEVELT 837 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938), quoted in WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE

AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83(1995).
97. ACKERMAN, supra note 52, at 310.
98. H.R. 253, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 183, 9 8th Cong. (1983); Voluntary School Prayer Act of
1983, S. 784, 9 8th Cong. (1983).
99. Public School Civil Rights Act of 1983, S. 139, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 798, 98th Cong.
(1983).
100. S.210, 9 8th Cong. (1983); S. 26, 98th Cong. (1983).
101. Judicial Reform Act of 1982, S. 3018, 9 7 th Cong. (1982); see Gerald Gunther, Congressional

Power To Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36
STAN. L. REv. 895, 895-96 (1984).
102.

See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465-66 (1986).

103.

Former Deputy Solicitor General Paul Bator wrote that court stripping "is a technique of
dealing with the Court that adopts the Court's own disregard of the Constitution's
structural spirit." Paul M. Bator, WithdrawingJurisdictionfom Federal Courts, 7 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 31, 31 (1984).
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These are inconvenient facts for someone seeking to demonstrate that the
origins of judicial supremacy lie in the support of the political branches.
Reconstructive presidents were to be our control group, after all. If they cannot
serve that function, we must look elsewhere to establish a connection between
political support and the advent and growth ofjudicial supremacy.
The prevalence of jurisdiction-stripping bills might be one promising
avenue. Even if it appears that disaffected presidents such as Roosevelt and
Reagan were capitulating as much as other presidents to the Court's
interpretive supremacy, perhaps we can measure the political branches' relative
support for judicial supremacy by assessing how hard Congress has tried to
take it away. Here the record is mixed. Reconstructive presidencies have indeed
been accompanied by legislative attempts to limit the Court's jurisdiction over
certain constitutional questions. Roosevelt's and Reagan's administrations saw
conspicuous court-stripping efforts, and the most famous such measure -the
partial repeal of the Court's appellate jurisdiction in order to affect the
disposition of Ex parte McCardle'0 4 - came as part of the reconstructive
program started by Lincoln and continued by the Reconstruction
Congresses.' And the fact that the court-stripping measures during the
Roosevelt and Reagan administrations failed-most do-does not in itself
indicate relative support for judicial supremacy. We will instead want to know
how the level of court-stripping activity compares to other, nonreconstructive
periods. If the political branches were no less sanguine about court stripping
during affiliated and oppositional presidencies, then it is difficult to make
confident claims about the relative strength of judicial supremacy during those
periods.1" 6
Historically, though, court-curbing rashes have hardly been unique to
reconstructive eras. As Gerald Gunther wrote, "Jurisdiction-curbing proposals
have surfaced in Congress in virtually every period of controversial federal
court decisions."' 07 Following Cohens v. Virginia, ' 8 for example, several

104.
105.

74 U.S. (7Wall.) 506 (1868).
During the pendency of the McCardle case, the House passed a measure that would have
required a two-thirds supermajority of Justices in order to invalidate an act of Congress. The
bill died in the Senate. See Friedman, supra note 94, at 28-29.

Our interest, moreover, extends beyond presidential initiatives, for the measure of judicial
supremacy's infirmity comprises both executive and legislative support for jurisdiction
stripping during reconstructive periods.
107. Gunther, supra note lo1, at 896.
io8. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (affirming the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85, which authorizes Supreme Court review of state court
judgments).
1o6.
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amendments and resolutions were offered in state legislatures as well as in
Congress proposing to relieve the Court of its appellate jurisdiction over state
court decisions.' °9 Prominent in recent memory is the 1957 Jenner bill, which
among other things would have deprived the Court of appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving the validity of the practices of congressional committees
and certain government regulation of subversive activities." 0 The bill, defeated
forty-nine to forty-one on the Senate floor,' was a direct response to Supreme
Court decisions in Communism-related cases such as Watkins v. United
States,"2' Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,"3 and Cole v. Young."l4 In 1964, in
the immediate wake of the Court's controversial decision in Reynolds v. Sims,"'
the House passed a bill that would have eliminated federal court jurisdiction
over reapportionment cases.", 6 In the last several years, bills have been
introduced to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving the pledge
of allegiance, challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act, and government
17
invocations of religion.
Posturing aside, actual legislative contractions of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction are exceptionally uncommon. The only successful instance is the

log. See Charles Warren, Legislativeand JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court of the United Statesa History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of theJudiciaryAct, 47 AM. L. REv. 1, 16-30 (1913).
110.

S. 2646, 8 5th Cong. (1957); see Shelden D. Elliott, Court-CurbingProposals in Congress, 33
597, 598 (1958). Similar measures were also proposed and rejected by the
eighty-fifth Congress. See Elliott, supra, at 6Ol-02 (summarizing proposals).
NOTRE DAME LAW.

111.

104

112.

354 U.S. 178 (1957) (reversing a contempt conviction where a witness before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities refused to answer questions related to certain
persons' membership in the Communist Party); see also Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956) (reversing dismissal of a New York City municipal employee for his
invocation of the right to self-incrimination in state proceedings related to past Communist
Party membership).

113.

353 U.S. 252 (1957) (reversing the state bar's denial of a law license on the ground that the
fact that an applicant attended Communist Party meetings did not equate with bad moral
character); see also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (same).

114.

351 U.S. 536 (1956) (reversing judgment against a civil servant who was dismissed for
associating with Communists).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).

115.

CONG. REC. 18,687 (1958).

116.

H.R. 11926, 88th Cong. (1964). The bill died in the Senate. More than 13o bills aimed at
limiting Court power over reapportionment were proposed in the House in the summer of
1964. See Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: Histoty and Purposes, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 565, 573 n.26 (1996).

117.

See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-StrippingLegislation, loi Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 192 n.1 (2007) (collecting bills
proposed to strip federal courts of jurisdiction).
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statute that withdrew jurisdiction over McCardle's case.", 8 There is political
sense in this rarity. In 1965 David Easton introduced the concept of "diffuse
support" into the political science lexicon. 19 Diffuse support refers to the
"reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members [of a political
system] to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of
which they see as damaging to their wants"; diffuse support sits in opposition
to "specific support," which "flows from the favorable attitudes and
predisposition stimulated by outputs that are perceived by members to meet
their demands as they arise or in anticipation." 2 ' We should expect agreement
with the substantive holdings of the Supreme Court to determine specific
support but to have only an indirect bearing on diffuse support. 2 ' The data
show that diffuse support for the Court, and in particular support for a robust
power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, achieves consistent and
stable majorities. 2 As Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum have written, "the
idea that the judicial branch should act as the final and authoritative interpreter
of the Constitution has been a profoundly popular one." '23
The evidence is shaky that the general favor of presidents is primarily or
even significantly generative of our ethos of judicial supremacy or that

118.

Ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44 (1868). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11o Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244-2266 (2000)), provides that the Court shall have no jurisdiction over denials of
leave to file second or successive habeas petitions. Id. § 2244(b)( 3 )(E). That section does not
constitute jurisdiction stripping because the gatekeeping system was itself created by
AEDPA. The statute did not remove the Court's jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions.
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (upholding the gatekeeping provision against an
Exceptions Clause challenge). A provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew federal
court jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions but was not directed specifically at the Supreme
Court. See 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1932).

119.

DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965).

szo. Id. at 273.
121.

See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme
Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisitesfor CourtLegitimation of Regime Changes, 2 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 357, 359 (1968) ("People who believe specific decisions are wrong, even wrongheaded,
and individual judges unworthy of their office may still [offer diffuse support] if they
respect the court as an institution that is generally impartial, just, and competent.").

122.

See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM J. POL. SCI. 635, 641 tbl.1
(1992); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama
Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1116 (1997).
Even during the Court-packing crisis, consistent majorities of Americans opposed limits on
the Court's power to invalidate acts of Congress. See PUBLIC OPINION 1935-46, at 148
(Hadley Cantril & Mildred Strunk eds., 1951).

123.

Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?,118 HARv. L. REv. 1594,
1637 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 2).
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reconstructive presidents' relative lack of support for judicial supremacy has
itself resulted in less judicial independence. More probably, reconstructive
periods and episodes of weak judicial authority have jointly resulted from
popular dissatisfaction with a prior regime. On this view, judicial supremacy
has been threatened not by popular presidents but by unpopular judicial
decisions. It likewise has been buoyed by the support of the people, not their
politicians."

III. THE PEOPLE'S COURT?

This Review has hypothesized that members of the public, more than
institutional political actors, have laid the foundations for judicial supremacy.
This is a difference of degree, of course, and it resists empirical assessment.
Whittington must be right that the support of most presidents most of the
time matters, and indeed may be necessary, to the survival of judicial
supremacy. To that extent, his detailed accounting of that support is helpful to
the many seeking to better understand the phenomenon. But I doubt he is
answering the most interesting question about judicial supremacy. Justice
Scalia gets to the heart of the matter: why would we "want to leave these
enormously important social questions to nine lawyers with no constraints? " 12
Whittington has told us why politicians support judicial supremacy. But why
do so many of the rest of us?126

Easton offered several theoretical reasons why people lend diffuse support
to a political system:

124- See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596 (2003)

(arguing based on social science literature that the public generally supports judicial
review); cf Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (2004) ("Because Article III lodges the
composition of the federal judiciary in the political control of the President and the Senate,
no judicial interpretation of the Constitution can withstand the mobilized, enduring, and
determined opposition of the people.").
125. Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 42.
126. Whittington acknowledges the limited scope of his project: "Whereas this book has focused

on the actions and words of elite political actors, public opinion scholars have emphasized
the potential value of diffuse support in the mass public for shoring up the judiciary....
[T]he account offered here suggests one way in which courts have won that diffuse
support." WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 289; cf. id. at 102 ("Judges are subject to many of
the same shifts in public mood and political and social circumstances that affect elected
officials.").
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If we wish, the outputs here may be considered psychic or symbolic and
in this sense, they may offer the individual immediate benefits strong
enough to stimulate a supportive response. Members may get
satisfaction, for example, from the promise of future greatness for their
system and even some gratification from being made to feel an
important part of a larger historical process that calls for present
restraint on behalf of future benefits for the political system, an object
which they come to identify in and for itself.127
Even granting that presidents and legislatures effectively convey the narrow
political preferences of majorities in the here and now, those institutions may
be ill-suited to respond to values that are less temporally contingent. ' 28 As with
institutional support, no consistent subliminal motive runs through all the
various reasons for public support for judicial supremacy. There is no single
"public," of course, either across time or at any historical moment. For
example, the factions who supported judicial supremacy during the Lochner
era, many of whom celebrated William McKinley's victory over William
Jennings Bryan in 1896, saw in the judiciary a different, more traditionally
conservative set of political commitments than those who supported judicial
supremacy during the Warren Court. And when we speak of public support,
we are not supposing a democratic majority; rather we are speaking
situationally, describing political actors by reference to their systemic
relationship to other political institutions. 2 9 The public voice is a vector forged
of sets of commitments and values that may be quite diverse individually. That
is no less true, I suggest, of public support for the idea that the Court should
have the final say in matters of constitutional interpretation. Consider the
following four possibilities.
First, many of us might believe it particularly important to devote
institutional resources to developing and sustaining a justice ethic. Courts
might get all sorts of questions wrong, and they might do so often, but the
federal judiciary's commitment in constitutional cases is to achieving outcomes
that are consistent with the Constitution. That commitment is unique among
the branches, the other two of which (quite properly) serve political and

127. EASTON, supra note 119, at 273-74.

128. See Friedman, supra note 124, at 2606.
1a9.

It is safe to say that most people do not think about the business of the federal courts very
much. See generally Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's, 120

HARv. L. REv. 4, 9 (2006) ("[N]either constitutional decisionmaking nor Supreme Court
adjudication occupies a substantial portion of the nation's policy agenda or the public's
interest ....
").
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constitutional masters alike. Most of us believe, moreover, that constitutional
guarantees are generally consistent with justice.' 3 ° We may wish the political
balance to tilt more toward solicitude for constitutional rights as an end in
itself-that is, as part of a substantive moral conception-or we may believe
that protection of those rights is instrumentally important to democratic
participation. Post and Siegel write, "Constitutional rights may instantiate the
very values that democracy seeks to establish, and they may also be necessary to
13
the discursive formation of popular will upon which democracy is based." '
Moreover, for some - to wit, those who are systematically in the minority - the
idea that certain constitutional rights must be protected above and beyond the
legislative process is not obviously inconsistent with their political
preferences.'
This knight-gallant vision of the Court as a protector of individual rights is
a historically contingent one. The Court did not by and large conceive of itself
as institutionally concerned with minority rights prior to the New Deal era,
and it has not generally been concerned with protecting individual economic
rights since.'33 Footnote four of Justice Stone's famous opinion in United States
v. Carolene Products Co. articulated a nascent solicitude for the rights of
minorities as such,"3 and World War II and the Cold War called for greater
scrutiny of the relationship between unchecked majoritarianism and oppressive

130.

See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1703, 1704 (1997) ("Within our legal culture the idea of fidelity to the Constitution is seen as
pretty much an unquestioned good."). But see MARK A. GRABER, DRED ScoTr AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EvIL (2006); CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL

TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
131. Post & Siegel, supra note 124, at 1036. Social scientific research has suggested that people
assess the actions of public officials "based on how fair the outcomes are for themselves and

others, rather than on the personal benefit or harm resulting from the decisions." TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 74 (1990).
132.

Cf.Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 122, at 640 n.7 (hypothesizing that positive feelings
engendered by Warren Court decisions help explain consistent support for the Court among

blacks).
133. See David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another
Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 743 (1981). See generally RANDY E.
BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)

(arguing for a reinvigoration of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and the Ninth Amendment).
134. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (implying that more searching judicial review might be
appropriate for "the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" (citation omitted)).

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

117:8 86

20o8

hegemony. As Richard Primus writes, "In an attempt to ground their
opposition to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, many Americans felt a need
to articulate some set of normative precepts outside of and prior to positive
law."' 3 s The residue of the Warren Court's commitment to that "set of
normative precepts" continues to influence the contemporary conception of the
role of constitutional courts in a democracy.
Second, the concern for justice may be generalized to other values that the
ordinary political process is not designed to protect or maximize. Judicial
review might, for example, correct for risk aversion within the polity. Tom
Ginsburg has proposed what he calls the "insurance model of constitutional
review. ' ,, 6 The model posits that political actors engaged in constitutional
design will fashion mechanisms for judicial review to guard against the risk
that they will be political losers in future elections.' 37 Those incentives exist for
ordinary citizens evaluating the system in place as much as for political
architects designing constitutions prospectively. A risk-averse citizen who is
consistently in the majority may still prefer to live within a system in which
statutes require judicial approval, even if she is likely to disagree with the
Court.'3
Judicial review might also help correct for variations in intensity of
preferences. We can hypothesize a universe of three issues: federal habeas, the
death penalty, and campaign finance. I might not feel very strongly about, but
generally favor, the enforcement of state death penalty laws and the habeas
restrictions imposed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, 3 9 but I might vigorously oppose campaign finance restrictions such as the
ones imposed by the BCRA. 140 I have legislative majorities on two of the three
issues, but I will nonetheless support judicial review, and its close cousin

135.

RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 178

(1999).

The direct

relationship between the Cold War and the American civil rights movement is explored in
great detail in MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
136. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 25 (2003).
137. Id.

138. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns ... ": The Political Foundations of
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 71 (2003) (constructing a model of
institutional political dynamics suggesting that "judicial independence becomes more
attractive as parties become more risk averse").
139. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11o Stat. 1214 (1996).
140. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as

amended at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).

GIVING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE COURTS

judicial supremacy, because I am in the legislative minority on the issue I care
about (campaign finance).
Third, the judiciary might provide a measure of predictability that people
find not only psychologically attractive but also useful in arranging their
personal and business affairs. Recall the FSIA example discussed earlier.
Whittington's model encourages observers to view the impetus behind the
statute in terms of the incentives on the State and Justice Departments. But the
FSIA is also a story of interest group politics. At the hearings over the bill, Cecil
Olmstead, a Texaco executive and chair of a lobbying group for transnational
companies, testified that enactment of the FSIA "should substantially reduce
certain risks of doing business with foreign governmental entities, reduce
costly litigation over immunity issues, and thus benefit the American business
community as a whole. '14' Similar testimony was offered by representatives of
private litigants, economic policy consultants, and other business interests.142
Citizens, especially corporate ones, cherish predictability. The courts' soft spot
for settled understandings, the relative stability of the Supreme Court's
membership, and the judicial commitment to consistent treatment of litigants
all mean that affairs governed by courts rather than politicians are relatively
likely to conform to prior expectations.' 43

141.

142.

143.

Hearing, supra note 24, at 8o (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead, Chairman, the Rule of Law
Comm., and Vice President, Texaco Co.).
See id. at 58 (statement of Peter D. Trooboff, Cochairman, Comm. on Transnat'l Judicial
Procedure, Am. Bar Ass'n) ("Private litigants will enjoy far greater certainty about the
applicable criteria than possible today with the incomplete and sometimes divergent
standards applied in State Department actions and court decisions."); id.
at 71 (statement of
Timothy W. Stanley, President, Int'l Econ. Policy Ass'n) ("[The FSIA] would regularize the
determination of whether sovereign immunity can be appropriately invoked, lodging the
determination in the courts on the basis of clearly set out standards, thus moving this
function from the State Department where it was often handled inconsistently and affected
by foreign policy considerations."); id.at 88 (statement of J. Roderick Heller, Partner,
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering) ("[The FSIA] will assist potential litigants and their counsel in
appraising the effective contractual provisions, the extent to which negotiations can take
into account the likelihood that a foreign state party could be subject to suit in the United
States and have those specific contractual provisions enforced. I submit that this type of
predictability is as important in negotiations as in litigation.").
Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878 (1975) ("The element of stability or continuity necessary
to enable interest-group politics to operate in the legislative arena is supplied, in the first
instance, by the procedural rules of the legislature, and in the second instance by the
existence of an independent judiciary.").
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In the end, much of our "support" for judicial supremacy may be inertial,
deriving from an unexamined devotion to the status quo.'" Judicial supremacy
is the devil we know, announced as ipse dixit in judicial opinions, buttressed
by self-interested politicians, and perpetuated in high school civics classes.
Tushnet in particular has suggested that the Court is not well-suited to play
the ambitious role that footnote four appeared to contemplate and that liberals
continue to mythologize. 14' Long before Dahl formalized the observation, Mr.
Dooley astutely remarked that "no matther whether th' constitution follows th'
flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns." 146 If courts are so
commonly instruments of the elected branches and yet lull us into deliberative
complacency, is it not time to wonder whether judicial supremacy is a
47
mistake ?'
What Tushnet and others keen on rethinking judicial supremacy overlook
is that inertia has its own set of virtues. Whittington describes political support
for judicial supremacy as a concession to the complexities of government. But
life, too, is complex. Amid the chores of our daily existence, who (besides
political zealots and academic lawyers) has both the time and the inclination to
devote mental energy to constitutional deliberation?
Resolving constitutional issues -including the rightful place of judges
within our system-is a contentious business that can crowd out other
priorities and that is not conducive to cooperation. Much social science
evidence suggests that individuals generally prefer not to discuss politics with
those who are not like-minded, and that when they do, it can lead to
148
resentment and polarization and can diminish overall social welfare.

144. In their 1966 study of specific and diffuse support for the Court, Murphy and Tanenhaus

found that even among those who could be classified as either having diffuse support or not
having it, 39.1% "could not specify a single thing they liked or disliked about what the Court
had done" and that 14.7% "could not offer any response at all when asked about the main
job of the Court." Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 121, at 373.
145. See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 129.
146. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901); see Dahl, supra note 47.
147. See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 154 (arguing that the effect of eliminating judicial review
entirely "would probably be rather small, taking all issues into account").
148. See, e.g., DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY 9-10, 89-124 (2006). Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin have argued that the
various "pathologies" of deliberation may be assuaged by manipulating the deliberative
context to reduce coercive influences. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN,
DELIBERATION DAY 63-65 (2004); cf David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What
Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 915 (2007) (concluding based on an
experiment conducted in Colorado that deliberation increased consensus within groups of
like-minded people and increased political polarization). Evaluating the virtues of
deliberative passivity will require us to assess both the potential for constructing ideal
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Matthew McCubbins and Daniel Rodriguez conducted a series of simple
experiments, for example, from which they concluded that deliberation is least
likely to improve social welfare when it is costly to speak and to listen to others,
particularly as the size of the group increases. 49 John Hibbing and Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse have concluded from extensive study of survey data that "people
do not want to make political decisions themselves, ... [and] would most
prefer decisions to be made by ... empathetic, non-self-interested decision
makers."' Within the popular consciousness, judges are those decision
makers. Of course, the scope of their own authority is of more than passing
interest to judges. But a deep reservoir of diffuse support suggests that we are
not generally bothered by potential judicial self-dealing, or at the very least that
any such concerns are dwarfed by the value judges provide as delegates in
matters of constitutional interpretation. As Robert Jackson wrote without the
benefit of empirical support, "It is certainly easier, and perhaps wiser, to let the
Justices, when they have a will to do so, work out a corrected pattern of judicial
restraint than to split our society as deeply as adoption of any formula for
limiting judicial power would be likely to do."' 5'
To the extent that public support for judicial supremacy proceeds from
little more than unexamined assumptions, Whittington's account may be
particularly useful. His model's explanations for political support for courts do
not situate presidents as mediators of citizens' risk aversion, desire for stability,
or solicitude for justice. Instead, and crucially for Whittington, a president is
an independent political force, linked to the political commitments of his
followers but uniquely able to act as "the 'interpreter-in-chief,' who can 'make
politics' by redefining the political landscape. 15 2 The less self-conscious the
public's reasons for supporting court finality, the less we should treat
politicians as mere reflectors of the public's preferences; we may assume with
Whittington, in other words, that the incentives of institutional political
players are indeed of independent significance. But the normal political process
is not the only effective outlet for the expression of public sentiment about the
judiciary, even if that sentiment is inchoate and little scrutinized. The levers of
popular control over the judiciary remain a bit mysterious, to be sure, but as

149.

conditions for deliberation and the prevalence of subideal conditions in ordinary life
experience. See MUTZ, supra, at 5.
See Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating Improve
Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 30-33 (2006).

15o. See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS'
BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 85-86 (2002).
151.

JACKSON,

supra note 93, at vii.

152. WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 17.
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Judge Posner says, judges, like the rest of us, "like to be liked."' 3 They also of
course experience and, as respected legal professionals, play an outsized role in
shaping the constitutional zeitgeist. We should assume that judges' selfconception will line up with the objective conception held by the culture of
which they are part."s4
CONCLUSION

It should not be surprising that constitutional theorists have shifted their
gaze from judicial review to judicial supremacy. Since the New Deal era,
judicial activism had been in the service of liberal individualism, as the Warren
and Burger Courts took aim at recalcitrant school boards, overzealous
prosecutors, antipornography crusaders, and such. Like the New Deal Courts
of old, the Rehnquist Court instead antagonized Congress, preventing it from
legislatively overruling Mirandav. Arizona and Employment Division v. Smith;'5
from abrogating state sovereign immunity under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act;" 56 from using state officials to help implement the Brady
Act; ' 7 and from passing nationwide legislation providing a federal civil remedy
for gender-motivated violence and banning gun possession near schools.' Just
as many conservatives sought refuge from the individual rights decisions of the
Warren and Burger Courts in a jurisprudence of original intent, some liberal
academics have sought to rebut the Rehnquist Court's structural critique by
resort to popular constitutionalism in all its sundry guises." 9

153. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 117 (1995).

154.

See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REV. 257, 325

(2005) ("The
Justices live on this planet and typically are aware of what happens on it.").
155. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (striking down, in part, 18 U.S.C.
§ 35o1(a) (2000), which sought to circumscribe application of the exclusionary rule in cases
in which suspects had not received the warnings dictated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down portions of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 20oobb (2000), as an invalid
exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and an
unconstitutional abrogation of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
156. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
157. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
158. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
159. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 2; TUSHNET, supra note 4; Post & Siegel, supra note 3;
Waldron, supra note 5.
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The turn to popular constitutionalism, though, entails a normative
argument for a system that in a sense we already have. Judicial supremacy is
born of a popular preference, perhaps the output of a give-and-take between
competing political actors who generally support it,160 but more likely a
generally beneficial (if not particularly democratic) way of ordering our
political affairs. It is, in other words, a "constitutional construction" that nicely
illustrates the explanatory payoff of Whittington's earlier work. That is not to
say that our constitutionalism should not be more engaged, more deliberative,
more popular, but those who would make that case must confront the
possibility that the people have spoken and that they just do not like the
answer.
There is another explanation beyond the political for a greater interest
among legal scholars in judicial supremacy: the continuing maturation of
constitutional theory as an academic discipline. The acculturation of we who
are lawyers to the norms of legal practice fosters a certain fascination with the
language of judicial opinions. Our existential engagement with the judicial
system makes it more difficult for us, both normatively and positively, to
evaluate judicial actors through the lens of institutional design rather than as
authoritative constitutional interpreters. 6 The insights of political scientists
such as Whittington are particularly valuable to that project. Whittington's
fixation on judicial supremacy as a descriptive political reality reflects his
professional orientation. His book's rigorous examination of the political
motivations and machinations behind judicial supremacy is an important
resource for anyone seeking to make normative claims about the phenomenon.
As Whittington himself acknowledges, however, it is not a complete resource.
Nor, I suspect, is it the most valuable. Understanding why we may prefer that
professional elites make some of our most momentous decisions for us will
ultimately require integrating law with insights from political science,
sociology, and psychology alike; for if judicial supremacy fails to satisfy, the
fault is not in our political stars, but in ourselves.

16o. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 76.

161. See generally Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 511 (2007) (noting the traditional
(but changing) tendency of legal academics to ignore the role of policy preferences and
partisan alignment in explaining judicial behavior).

